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Abstract
The issue of machines replacing humans dates back to the dawn of industri-
alisation. In this paper we examine what is fundamental in the distinction
between human and robotic work by reflecting on the work of the classical
political economists and engineers. We examine the relationship between the
ideas of machine work and human work on the part of Marx and Watt as
well as their role in the creation of economic value. We examine the extent
to which artificial power sources could feasibly substitute for human effort
in their arguments. We go on to examine the differing views of Smith and
Marx with respect to the economic effort contributed by animals and consider
whether the philosophical distinction made between human and non-human
work can be sustained in the light of modern biological research. We empha-
sise the non-universal character of animal work before going on to discuss the
ideas of universal machines in Capek and Turing giving as a counter example
a cloth-folding robot being developed in our School. We then return to Watt
and discuss the development of thermodynamics and information theory. We
show how recent research has led to a unification not only of these fields but
also a unitary understanding of the labour process and the value-creation
process.
We look at the implications of general robotisation for profitability and
the future of capitalism. For this we draw on the work of von Neumann not
only on computers but also in economics to point to the real threat posed by
robots.
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1. Introduction
From the 1950s onwards the threat that automation posed to human
labour became a persistent theme in popular science fiction [1, 2]. Authors
explored what it meant to be human, by contrasting us with hypothetical
robots. Such robots were generally seen as coming into existence centuries
into the future. In the last decade the rate of progress in robotics has accel-
erated way beyond popular expectation. The timescales of Asimov and Dick
look generous, whereas the dystopian near future of ‘Player Piano’ [3] seems
grimly real. This anxiety is not limited to novelists. Even Stephen Hawking
told the BBC:
“The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end
of the human race.” [4]
Robotics is made possible by advances in mechanical engineering but,
above all, by informatics. In this essay we look at how ideas derived from
informatics allow us a more precise view of what differentiates us from robots
and, on the other hand, how information science can give us a deeper insight
into the nature of human labour. Having gained this understanding, we can
go on to examine what sort of threat robots really pose to us, as humans.
We commence by exploring the concept of labour and the differences
between being being paid for labour, or the ability to labour, in Section 2. In
Section 3 we consider alternative sources of value than labour, and conclude
that, of all commodities, labour is the only one that matches best to prices. In
Section 4 we explain the important distinctions between horses and humans,
and explain why machines were indeed able to replace the former. Then in
Section 5 we look at Turing’s universal machine and the latest research into
robot capabilities. In Section 6 we explore the links between the laws of
thermodynamics and the concept of value and conclude, in Section 7, that
human labour is still important. Section 8 revisits the seminal work of Von
Neumann to consider, once again, the feasibility of a robot-dominated world.
Section 9 reflects on the arguments made and Section 10 concludes.
2. Ideas of Work and Power
Marx famously made a distinction between labour and labour-power [5].
We will explain what he meant by this distinction.
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Marx had a problem explaining the apparent dichotomy between these
terms. On the one hand all market sales can be seen as fair and equal
exchanges. On the other, the end result of these fair and equal exchanges was
the production of something whereby one group of people became immensely
wealthy at the expense of another group. How did this state of affairs result
from a fair and equal exchange? One explanation could be that workers are
cheated of the value of the labour: they are only paid part of the value of
their labour because the market is rigged in such a way that they can never
sell it for the full value.
Marx pondered how you could have a situation where it appears that the
labourer is paid a fair price for his labour, which is the price, according to
Ricardo [6], that is necessary to maintain and reproduce the labouring class,
and at the same time there is profit and exploitation. And he, in effect,
concludes: “Well, what is actually happening is that people are not being
paid for their work, they are actually being paid for their ability to work.”
A self-employed craftsman who makes something and sells it on the mar-
ket, sells the product of his labour directly. Similarly with a roofer who
comes and repairs your roof. They are paid directly for their actual work. If
somebody is employed in a cotton mill to spin cotton, they do not sell the
product of their labour; what they are selling is their ability to labour. The
amount of labour that the employer can get out of a worker per day is a
variable quantity. Its duration and intensity are variable. Characteristically
of the time Marx was writing, working hours were extremely long, and had
been progressively extended by the factory system. The intensity was, with
mechanisation, tied to the speed at which the machinery in the mill operated.
When the water was high in the river, the work was more intense:
O, dear me, the mill is running fast
And we poor shifters canna get nae rest
Shifting bobbins coarse and fine
They fairly make you work for your ten and nine
O, dear me, I wish this day were done
Running up and doon the Pass is nae fun
Shiftin’, piecin’, spinning warp, weft and twine
To feed and clothe ma bairnie offa ten and nine
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The Jute Mill Song of the Dundee weavers, first recorded by Ewan
MacColl, published by Mary Brooksbank [7]
What was being sold was the ability to labour. The amount of labour
that the employer got out of that could be quite a lot more, according to the
conditions of labour. This distinction between labour itself and the ability
to labour must have some origin. Society must have prepared us for this
distinction. So, where did these concepts actually come from?
There is reason to believe that this distinction originated at the start
of the industrial revolution when Watt was producing steam engines. Watt
didn’t actually invent the steam engine. He was set the task of repairing a
model Newcomb Engine, when he was a technician at Glasgow University.
These engines were used for pumping: they had no rotary motion, because
they were purely pumping engines. Watt looked at this, and because he had
been working along with Black on the nature of heat [8], he realised that, in
fact, these Newcomb engines were very inefficient because they threw away
heat. They repeatedly cooled the piston down by condensing the steam in the
piston by spraying water into it, and therefore a lot of the heat was wasted.
What Watt actually did was to invent the separate condenser, whereby the
heat was removed from the steam in a separate vessel. He also invented a
series of automatic valves, which let the steam through from the piston into
the condenser, or let steam into the other side of the piston, and this led to
a great improvement in the efficiency of steam engines.
These steam engines were hired out by Watts’ company, and he promised
to hire them out for less than the saving in coal people would have made if
they used a Newcomb Engine. In order to do that, he needed to have some
way of measuring how much work these engines were doing and rating their
power. Since the alternative to using an engine was to use horses, he became
the first person systematically to study the amount of work a horse could
do and thus introduce the concept of horsepower. In doing this he was the
first person to make the distinction between the ability to do work, which
was the power of the horse, and the actual work. For Watt, work was purely
labour, pure effort: the effort of a horse or the effort of a person hauling up
weights, physical exertion of effort. When you think of society in the late
18th century that is a very reasonable assessment of what work was, because
most work entailed physical exertion of human muscle. That was primarily
what people were being paid to do. Most of it was heavy, physical work.
In Adam Smith’s writings this marrying of physical effort with labour
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is such that Smith can talk with ease about a farmer having his labouring
servants and his labouring cattle, because they are both seen as doing the
same thing2. What Watt promises people is power, the ability to do work
with his machines. Matthew Boulton, his partner, proudly announced to
George II: “Your Majesty, I have at my disposal what the whole world de-
mands; something which will uplift civilization more than ever by relieving
man of undignified drudgery. I have steam power”. By this means he is go-
ing to transform the wealth of society. In a real sense he does this, because
the power of his machines, within a few decades, are turning out more effort
than all the muscle power of the human beings and horses in the kingdom.
From that perspective he seems to have caught a key aspect of labour and of
power, and that conceptualisation is still very much present in the classical
political economists.
Smith says that labour is the original currency by which we win things
from nature3 and he also talks of labour as something that both humans
and animals do. Both are seen, in that society, as labour. He knows that
animals aren’t skilled and that there is a limit to the labour they can do:
they can not participate in the division of labour, for example. Smith is also
interested in why things are valuable, and he quickly disposes of the idea that
it is because they are useful. He points out that there are lots of valuable
things that aren’t particularly useful. The only constant is that things which
are valuable require a lot of work to produce. At that point in time, at the
dawn of the industrial age, when most labour was physical, the distinction
between the kinds of labour that Watt and Smith were researching at Glasgow
University, was not clear. They were both dealing with work: Smith was
dealing with how work could be made more efficient by sub-dividing and
specialising labour, and Watt was looking at how work could be replaced by
2“That part of the capital of the farmer which is employed in the instruments of agri-
culture is a fixed, that which is employed in the wages and maintenance of his labouring
servants, is a circulating capital. He makes a profit of the one by keeping it in his own
possession, and of the other by parting with it. The price or value of his labouring cattle
is a fixed capital in the same manner as that of the instruments of husbandry. Their
maintenance is a circulating capital in the same manner as that of the labouring servants”
([9] II.1.10 )
3The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the
necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always
either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce
from other nations. ([9]I.I.1 )
5
artificial sources of power.
What is striking in Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’ is that he does not discuss
the use of powered machinery. All his economic improvements come from the
sub-division of labour so that people can complete their tasks more quickly.
By doing the same task again and again, they become more skilled at it, their
movements become more automatic, and they do not lose time switching
between tasks, and thereby more is produced. This vision of production is
still pre-industrial, because powered industry didn’t exist at that point. One
stand-out exception was the water mills, but, apart from the production of
flour, mass production wasn’t generally based on powered machinery.
Marx takes the labour theory of value over from Smith and he makes it
more precise in some ways because Smith confuses how much labour you can
purchase with how much labour is required to make something, and he treats
these as much the same thing. In a pre-industrial society of handicrafts and
farmers they are essentially the same thing. When a Scottish farmer puts
his grain on sale and buys, in return, some produce from the blacksmith, the
value of his corn can be expressed in terms of how much of other people’s
labour he could command with it. He was indirectly commanding the labour
of other tradesmen.
So, the the idea that value equals the amount of labour you can command
has an intuitive appeal in a pre-capitalist, or only partially capitalist, society.
Once capitalism becomes widespread it is not the same thing at all because
wages only make up a part of the value of what is sold. Although something
may require a certain amount of labour, the employer hasn’t had to pay that
much to his workers, so the item actually commands more labour than it
requires to produce.
This distinction between labour commanded and labour embodied was
pointed out by Ricardo, writing after the introduction of capitalist machinery
in the late 19th Century [6]. These distinctions, which were not apparent in
the mid-18th century, started becoming apparent in the early 19th Century,
and Marx bases his distinction on the one Ricardo makes. He tries to explain
how it is still possible that everything sells for its value and yet exploitation
still results. His explanation is based on the distinction between power and
work done, which we are arguing that he essentially derives from Watt.
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3. Other Possible Sources of Value
Is this distinction between value and the power to create it specific to
human labour? It is probably a property of whatever you take to be the
value substance. Suppose you take the British economy, and instead of trying
to calculate the labour value of all the products of the main industries, you
choose to say: “we will treat oil as the substance of value”, and “The value
of each product is the number of barrels of oil that has to be directly or
indirectly used to make that product.” Now, for gasoline that’s relatively
simple. Plastics are also going to involve oil going into their production.
But you then consider something like a TV set, and a TV set is going to
require oil to have been burnt to provide the energy to transport it, oil being
burnt to provide the energy to manufacture the parts, and then in addition
it will have oil going into the plastics which make up the frame of it. You
can systematically do this if you use the input/output tables: you can work
out how much oil goes into everything. The obvious next logical question is:
“What is the value of oil itself?” Well, if you are going to be consistent, you
would say: “It is the amount of oil required to produce it.” What do you
discover?
You discover that it takes less than one barrel of oil, directly or indirectly,
to produce a barrel of oil. If you took that definition, you would find that
after one attempt at your calculations the value of a barrel oil is not one full
barrel, but maybe a third of a barrel of oil has to be used to make a barrel
of oil, so that the value of everything would have suddenly dropped by a
third. The next time you attempt to calculate it, again it drops further. The
point is that whatever commodity you take to be your value substance, in a
functioning economy, it always requires less than one unit of the substance
to make one unit of it. It is a property of saying something is the value
substance, that you have to make that distinction.
You can do the same for steel, electricity, etc [10]. It is obvious that you
have to take basic commodities, ones used in the production of everything
else, directly or indirectly, to make the calculation. There is a limited number
of these basic commodities: not all commodities are basic in that sense [11].
But, in what Marx called ‘Sector 1’ of the economy, these products are used
directly or indirectly to make everything else. You could, in principle, choose
any one of those and say: “this is the substance of value”. You could get an
internally consistent theory of value from that. The question is: would it be
empirically accurate in predicting prices?
7
When you try investigating, you find that energy theories, oil theories or
steel theories of value give a much poorer prediction of actual prices than
the labour theory of value. Although, in principle, you could make that
distinction for any commodity, it actually turns out that the only one that
empirically makes sense is labour.
4. Humans and Horses
Since Watt’s engines replaced horses as sources of power, why have other
machines not replaced people as well? It comes down to the fact that there
is more to work than just muscular energy. Where it is just muscular energy,
it is not too difficult to replace with machinery. Thus horses got replaced
very quickly, and somewhat later, the heavy labour of the navvies who dug
the railways was replaced by the work of earth-moving machines and diggers
of one sort or another. That only occurs when the wages rise enough for it
to be worth using the machines, but once it is worth engaging machines, the
people can indeed be replaced. The difference between a human being and
a horse is that a horse can only pull: you can not set a horse to spin or tend
the sails of a ship. Human beings, on the other hand, can be set to almost
any labouring task.
They may not be terribly good at it, but they are adaptable, and it is this
adaptability which must be a fundamental reason why we are the dominant
species. We are, in effect, universal robots. And that, of course, is a bit of
pun because the term robot in English comes from Capek’s [12] play, which
was written in the twenties and involves an English inventor Rossum, who
comes to Prague and sets up a factory making mechanical men who are
universal robots. And, of course, ‘robot’ in the Slavic language just means
‘worker’. These fictional universal robots really did represent a threat to
humans, because they could do any job that a human could do.
Such a universal robot would be a real existential threat to human be-
ings because at that point the wealthy could see no point in maintaining a
labouring population. In countries where they remained in control one hates
to think what would happen. Bear in mind, and this is something that nov-
elists have not been slow to point out, that if robots really were capable of
replacing human beings in all these tasks, they would have to have as com-
plex an internal life as we do. In Philip K. Dick’s novel, “Do Androids Dream
of Electric Sheep” [1], which was turned into the movie “Blade Runner”, he
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is essentially making the point that the Androids would rebel. The same
capabilities would come with the same motivations.
The ideas that people form are obviously shaped by the technologies they
grow up with [13]. The idea of a robot wasn’t there in Marx’s day. To our
minds, the distinctions he uses to define labour do not hold up in the light
of modern science. He says that the distinction between human labour and
what animals do is that the humans form a plan and have a vision of what
they are going to achieve before they do it. This sort of sharp distinction
between the activity of humans and of animals, cannot be sustained in the
light of modern science. It couldn’t even be sustained in the light of Darwin’s
writings:
It has often been said that no animal uses any tool; but the chim-
panzee in a state of nature cracks a native fruit, somewhat like a
walnut, with a stone.([14] page 28)
This tool use in chimps is subsequently well documented by Goodall[15]. It
is difficult to say that animals do not consciously plan actions or do not
consciously have an intention.
“Brehm states, on the authority of the well-known traveller Schim-
per, that in Abyssinia when the baboons belonging to one species
(C. gelada) descend in troops from the mountains to plunder the
fields, they sometimes encounter troops of another species (C.
hamadryas), and then a fight ensues. The Geladas roll down great
stones, which the Hamadryas try to avoid, and then both species,
making a great uproar, rush furiously against each other. Brehm,
when accompanying the Duke of Coburg-Gotha, aided in an at-
tack with fire-arms on a troop of baboons in the pass of Mensa
in Abyssinia. The baboons in return rolled so many stones down
the mountain, some as large as a man’s head, that the attackers
had to beat a hasty retreat; and the pass was actually closed for
a time against the caravan. It deserves notice that these baboons
thus acted in concert”.([14] page 28)
If we consider a wolf pack, dividing a task up so that some will chase the
deer and others will ambush it: this is clearly intentional behaviour. They
may not be able to talk, but they communicate and carry out intentional
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behaviour. Hunter [16] relates how a buffalo deliberately stalks and gores a
hunter. Any zoologist is bound to be able to cite many other examples.
The hard and fast distinction between humans and animals is thus unten-
able. What is sustainable is that humans are able to formulate and materi-
alise plans for activity. There are current investigations into whether animals
(at least mammalians) actually plan and use episodic memory [17]. What is
incontrovertible is that humans can record and debate their plans. They can
record them in language, which can be memorised using episodic memory.
They can write them down using symbols and drawings. This ability affords
a much more complex division of labour, which is non-instinctive in human
societies.
Obviously social insects such as ants demonstrate a complex division of
labour, and Marx recognises that, and says that: “Bees put many architects
to shame”. However he also says: “Bees never form an image of what they
are intending to do”. It may be true that bees do not form an image of what
they are intending to do, and that they are merely following instinct, He gives
another example of the spider who, he says “puts spinners to shame”. Recent
experimental work indicated that spiders are able to form plans [18, 19].
Researchers place spiders on top of pencils in a 3-dimensional space in an
enclosed bottle with another insect they want on the top of another pencil.
The spiders form a strategy of how to get there, and people now think that
in order to build a web they are actually behaving intentionally.
It is not even feasible to say that only humans have culture, because
we know that certain forms of tool use in apes [20] and macaques [21] is
cultural, and we know that certain different groups of whales have local
cultures, different distinct ways of hunting and co-operating. Chimpanzees
adapt to local grunts when relocated [22].
None of these is the key distinction. We think the key distinctions are
(1) the flexibility we get from having hands, (2) the fact that we can com-
municate plans to one another via language, and (3) the fact that we can
read other humans’ minds. There is no other species on earth, at present,
which combines these traits. There are species which appear to be able to
communicate (whales and porpoises) [23] but they do not have hands. There
are other species with hands, but they do not have language [24]. Lieberman
[25] claims that humans have a unique ability to understand the minds of
others. He argues that this gives us a strong advantage over other species
because it allows us to cooperate, and such cooperation leads to survival.
Other animals cooperate but do not have insight the workings of the minds
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of others. Other research claims that other primates have, at least in em-
bryonic form, something analogous to the human theory of mind [26]. This
idea that empathy, or a theory of mind, is an innate human trait goes back
at least to Smith [27, 28]. Even if we allow for a theory of mind in other
primates, the trio : hands, empathy and language are ours alone.
5. The Universal Machine
Alan Turing at first introduced the idea of the universal computer [29]
as a machine that is capable of doing any mathematical operation that a
human mathematician can do. It is worth looking at how he analysed what
a human mathematician does, because mathematics, in his day, was taken to
be the most abstract and rational type of human activity, something uniquely
human at that point. He talks about someone wanting to do a calculation:
they need squared paper, they write numbers down, and then they do things
such as adding or multiplying them. When someone does that, they are
always just looking at a small area of the sheet of paper they are concentrating
on. For example, the column of digits being added up. They keep a small
running total in their working memory. Every time it runs over ten, they
write a little one next to the next column of digits (if you recall how you
were taught to do this at school). So essentially all mathematics comes down
to the mathematician being able to see a certain number of symbols at once,
having a certain state of mind, and, on the basis of that state of mind, writing
down new symbols. Possibly if he has an eraser, rubbing something out. So
Turing says:
“Suppose I build a machine that can do the same thing?”
The first machine has a tape instead of a square sheet of paper i.e. a long
strip of paper with squares on it. The machine can write numbers down on
that. The machine is aware of the current number, and it is aware of its state
of mind. On the basis of looking at the current number and the internal state
of mind, it writes another number down, or moves the tape left or right, and
changes its state of mind. So he argues: “With this very simple machine, I
capture the essence of what a mathematician is able to do, and from that I
can build a universal machine.”
The universal machine is slightly different from just that particular ab-
stract Turing machine, in that it is a Turing machine that can be given
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instructions that enable it to emulate any other Turing Machine. This Uni-
versal Turing Machine can therefore, in principle, given the right program,
solve any mathematical problem. That was what Turing’s goal was when
he started work on trying to develop a practical universal computer, after
the war. His goal was to specify a machine that could solve any mathemat-
ical problem, including perform any proof that a mathematician could, in
principle, perform. He wasn’t the first person to have thought of a universal
calculator. The same basic idea had occurred to Babbage in the early 19th
Century [30]. He said that if he had a machine of a certain degree complex-
ity, he suddenly realised it could solve any mathematical problem. Turing
wasn’t the first person to do it, but he expressed it more clearly than anyone
before that. He used this idea of the universal machine to reflect back on the
limits of mathematics and what mathematicians can not do. He showed that
Hilbert’s formalist project in mathematics, i.e. the attempt to found all of
the discipline on fixed sets of axioms and rules of inference, must fail [31, 32].
Turing invented his universal computer first as a thought experiment to il-
luminate the limits of human mathematics. Only later does he set about
building it as a practical machine [33].
It is interesting that his idea of the universal machine is published the
same year that Karel Capek’s play was put on the BBC. Thus the idea of
a universal robot, of a universal machine, was part of the concepts of the
day, and Turing is applying it in a specifically mathematical context. We
know that he succeeded: he came up with designs which later generalised
and we have these machines on our desks and in our pockets today. The
thing about these machines is that they are not like all previous machines.
Previous machines were built to achieve one given task, whereas computers
can be applied to any information processing task; given sufficient time they
will solve it. That has all sorts of economies, because it means only one
design of computer needs to be settled on, and it can be mass produced. So,
to an extent, this universality in information processing has been achieved by
machinery. It must be remembered that they are disembodied intelligences,
fairly limited intelligences at the moment.
At the University of Glasgow we have been working with European col-
leagues on the CLOPEMA project developing a cloth-folding robot [34, 35].
It is an extraordinarily difficult task for a robot even to do the things we do
easily, like picking up and folding clothes. It is challenging to get a robot to
even figure out the right place to pick clothes up; things that humans find
trivial, even at a very young age. The automatic hand-eye coordination that
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Figure 1: The CLOPEMA cloth-folding robot recognising and folding a towel. The chasis
of this robot is typically a Motoman industrial unit, but it has been fitted with advanced
sensing: stereo vision, touch sensitive grippers, close range cameras on its arms, force
sensors in its wrists.
we have is incredibly time consuming and complicated to express mathemat-
ically. In essence we are still a long way from robots being able to do all sorts
of things which are trivial human labour tasks. For example, if you have a
hospital laundry, there will be specialised machines which are very good at
folding clothes. They do not have general intelligence. They can fold clothes
very fast, faster than a human being. They do it by laying the clothes out
and having various flaps which come over to flap over the arms of a shirt.
Such a special-purpose classical industrial mechanical engineering is not yet
universal robotics. The engineering science of robotics is advancing at an ex-
traordinary rate at the moment. There are robot animals, robot dogs, robot
ponies, and various other animals which have been made by the robot labs
at Boston, that can walk or run through the woods with the kind of gait that
animals have.
Those things which have been most difficult are the things which humans
find easy to do, the non-rational things. It is only very recently that robots
have been capable of avoiding obstacles or moving realistically.
Our cloth-folding robot weighs a ton, and is screwed onto a concrete floor
on the 7th floor of a building that we had to specially reinforce to take it, so
it is a long way from something that can be deployed in just any workplace.
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Just as you can use hours of labour of a standard skill level to determine
the value of things, in computing, in principle, you measure the complexity
of any algorithm by the number of cycles of a Turing Machine it would
take. Nobody actually uses a Turing Machine, because they are relatively
inefficient. It is an active research topic at the moment to see how the
number of cycles of one type of machine and the length of programs you
need for machines vary according to the semantic power of the machines.
These things are not properly understood yet, but, in principle, we know that
any computation that can be done on any other machine can be done on a
Universal Turing Machine. Subject to some efficiency factor the complexity of
these different calculations is equivalent. That is one of the strong hypotheses
of computer science: it is not proven, but a strongly-accepted hypothesis.
6. From the laws of Thermodynamics to Values.
Essentially thermodynamics started with the attempt by Watt to improve
the efficiency of steam engines. Watt already realised that heat was being
converted to work, and that the more efficient your conversion of heat into
work, the more efficient the steam engine. Carnot [36] subsequently shows
that there is ultimately a maximum efficiency that a heat engine can achieve.
In any heat engine the efficiency is related to the temperature difference
between the input and output heat. Clausius [37] subsequently forms the
laws of thermodynamics saying that heat always goes from a body of high
temperature to one of low temperature; that you can not convert heat with
complete efficiency into work, whereas Joule shows you can convert work
back into heat [38]. There is an irreversibility to thermodynamic processes.
Then in the 1940s a telephone engineer working for Bell Laboratories
in the States was trying to quantify the information-carrying capacity of
telephone wires. Here we have something very similar to Watt. Watt was
trying to quantify something which is an everyday concept — the concept
of work — and he gives it a scientific meaning. Information was obviously
an everyday concept prior to Shannon [39], but once you say: “How do we
measure it?”, you have to give it a rigorous definition, and Shannon was able
to give the information content of telephone messages or telex messages a
rigorous definition in terms of probability theory.
When you work through the maths of the probability theory, you come
up with what is effectively the same formula as Boltzmann [40] came up
with when he was trying to formulate the laws of thermodynamics in terms
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of molecular motions and probability of movements of molecules. Shannon
then realises that information and entropy are the same thing, and this is
paradoxical because people think that information is the opposite of entropy,
but what Shannon showed was that the transmission of information along
a digital signal is maximized as that stream of bits becomes indistinguish-
able from random numbers, from random noise. The further away it is from
random noise, the more redundant the encoding is, the less efficient it is
at transmitting information. This represented a fundamental, huge trans-
formation of the way people thought of information. If you read people’s
commentaries in the 1950s, a lot of people still did not understand it back
then. Nowadays, if you are working on information theory, data compres-
sion or video compression, you treat them as the same thing. Entropy and
information are essentially the same thing and that is now widely understood.
Entropy is the idea of disorder versus order. The unexpected thing is
that this increase in disorder goes with increased information. If you have
a hot cup of coffee in a room, for example, over time it will become the
same temperature as the entire room, so it is more disordered: the heat has
dissipated.
Basically, Boltzmann is saying: “What is the probability of getting some-
thing at a given state.”. A state where all the heat is in the coffee cup is less
probable than one in where it is being spread around the room. There are
a lot more ways the thermal energy can be carried by all the gas molecules
in the room, than there are ways in which it can be carried just in the coffee
cup. So that, over time, the system will move to a more probable state,
which is the heat spread across the room. It is from that that the maths
comes out which gives you the same formula that Shannon used4.
Shannon’s idea, then, was that if you send a message down a wire, say
I’m talking, and I keep on saying the words ‘then’ and ‘and’, it is not very
efficient. We could express it by crunching it down into a smaller message.
This was recognised even by Samuel Morse. When he devised his morse code
he used a shorter series of dots and dashes for frequently-used letters than
for less frequently-used letters. E is just ( . ) A is ( . - ) but Y is ( - . - -
). In general, if you are transmitting video data and you watch something
from YouTube, that is exactly what is being done. The frequently occurring
patterns in a scene can be sent with fewer bits that the more rarely occurring
4H =
∑
P logP
15
patterns. At every stage in the development of robotic perception we make
use of Shannon’s concepts.
To apply this to political economy, you then have to go one more step
further in the development of the understanding of information that was
achieved in the 60’s, when Chaitin [41] was working on the problem of what
we mean by a random numbers. In Russia, at the same time, Kolmogorov
[42] also came up with the idea that a number is random if there is no formula
shorter than that which we can generate that sequence of numbers. Chaitin
later formalised this by saying: a sequence of digits is random if there is no
Turing Machine program to print it shorter than that sequence of digits which
were printed out.
This gives another definition of the information content of something.
When Shannon was talking about information content and entropy, he was
talking about it in terms of probability theory. Chaitin [43] gives you a
different, non-probabilistic definition of information, which is based just on
how few bits you need to print this information out. The shortest number of
bits that you need to print something out on a computer is the information
content. So, for example, he says pi has a sequence of digits that go on for
ever, but in fact, quite a small program, if you set it going, can go on printing
the digits. Although these digits of are unpredictable unless you compute
them, the actual information content is set by the length of the computer
program which prints it.
This is a very deep idea related to what the nature of randomness is, and
what the nature of information is. If you look at industrial production, you
see that a whole series of revolutions in industrial production have occurred
through information economies.
If we take one of the first ones, it is the invention of the potter’s wheel.
The potter’s wheel enables the mass production of round pots. Why? Be-
cause a round object has low information content. All you need to do is
specify the radius because that radius is shared by all points on the circum-
ference of the pot, and the potter specifies the radius between his or her finger
and thumb, as the pot is spun. You are essentially using a small amount of
information to shape the whole pot.
If you do not have a potter’s wheel you have to go all the way around,
squishing and shaping: you do not get it perfectly round, and it takes much
longer. There’s a whole series of classical industrial techniques which all
depend on spinning things around, so that things turned on a lathe are
obviously the other main example of that. Another economy of information
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which transformed things was the simultaneous application of information
at right angles to the item being shaped. There are two historical industries
from a long, long time ago where this type of technique was employed for
mass production. The Samianware5 industry of Gaul, in Roman Gaul, mass
produced high-quality pottery with molded surfaces, so it has all sorts of
Satyrs and Gods on the surface, and that is done by making a mold into
which you pour the clay before it is completely hardened. Unlike the potters
wheel, you are actually able to convey a lot more information to it, and you
get something much more elaborate.
Instead of one point, which is the expression of the width of the pot that
you do with your finger, there are many different artistic things that can be
put on this one mold, and then copied.
You can use the mold repeatedly, so the human labour is initially used in
carving the mold, once only. The mold subsequently transfers that informa-
tion (that has taken the human a long time to produce) onto many, many
pots. Another example of that very early on is the trigger mechanisms of
crossbows that the Qin empire6 used. They are mass produced, standardised
trigger mechanisms. One is astonished to see samples from the Emperor’s
tomb, with the ceramic warriors. What is astonishing is the quality of the
metalwork, the bronze swords, and the metalwork in the crossbows. These
are mass produced, again using molds, to standardise size and shape.
We then come forward to Babbage. After Adam Smith, Babbage, was
the next economist, who was really concerned about the basis of industrial
productivity. Smith had been concerned about it and explained it terms of
the division of labour. Babbage actually had superior engineering knowledge
to Smith, and in his book [30] he identifies other principles than the simple
division of labour which lead to increases in production, and the techniques
of copying he identifies as being absolutely key.
Another industry which produced a huge transformation was the printing
industry. If we analyse that in terms of information theory and entropy, what
you start off with is just random cellulose fibers which are in a mush and
they are completely disordered. You boil it up, and then you roll it out to
5http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight\_objects/pe\
_prb/s/samian\_ware\_pottery.aspx
6https://www.boundless.com/art-history/textbooks/
boundless-art-history-textbook/chinese-and-korean-art-before-1279-14/
the-qin-dynasty-96/art-of-the-qin-dynasty-459-5603/
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form paper, and this process of rolling it out is a process of reducing the
entropy of the material: it has few degrees of freedom. Fibres in paper are
forced to align with the surface, and therefore have fewer degrees of freedom.
There is less randomness in it, it is more ordered; it has lower entropy.
Having produced a low entropy material, you can then add human informa-
tion to it. You’ve reduced the natural information in it, and you replace it
with human information when you bring down the printing head and write
letters on it. This printing head coming down is the same technology that
is used in molding. The printer head comes down and it puts a dye onto
the paper and now the paper is more disordered between white and black.
Essentially we’ve got more disorder in that paper.
Another anecdote serves to illustrate this point. Borges writes about the
universal library [44] where every possible book exists, with is every possible
permutation of letters. Obviously the great bulk of those means nothing, but
some do mean something. There is a huge number of possible permutations
of letters that a printer can put on a paper, but he puts one particular
combination, which is a human-specified combination.
If you look at a lot of manufacturing processes, they start out by reducing
the entropy of a material, and then they add some kind of human-specified
information to it. It is the same process that takes place to make a car. A lot
of energy has to be used to reduce the entropy of iron-ore to make iron, and
more work is then done to reduce the entropy of a large block of iron and turn
it into a flat, rolled sheet. Given sheet-steel, which can be pressed into any
shape, a particular die will force it into a car door shape. It is doing the same
thing as the Samianware does: conveying information in parallel. If we look
at the mass production industries, they are dominated by industries which
are able to transfer human-generated information, in parallel, at right angles
onto the substance. The industry which has had the hugest improvement, the
semiconductor industry, is essentially a printing industry — a micro printing
industry.
Essentially all this becomes evident once you digitise production. Suppose
you are printing something, you actually know how many bits you have to
send to the laser-printer to print the information. Take the different types
of laser-printers. With the first generation of laser-printers you had to send
every bit to the laser-printer at 300 dots per inch: you had to switch the print
head on and off, on and off, on and off. Then Adobe invented postscript.
What postscript does is that it essentially turns your laser into a Turing
Machine. What you send to the printer is a postscript program that then
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prints your image. Every time you use an Adobe postscript laser-printer,
you are applying Chaitin’s theorem. You are sending less information than
is na¨ıvely required. because you are sending a program to print the whole
thing.
7. Evidence that Labour is still Important
There is a lot of empirical evidence that supports the classical Labour
Theory of Value. Orthodox economics pays no attention to it, doesn’t believe
it is true at all, and doesn’t take it seriously. But it is actually very well
supported empirically. Consider almost any country. If you compute the
amount of labour required to produce the output of every industry, you can
see by how much the output of that industry sells. There will be more than
a 95% correlation coefficient between the two. This means that 95% of the
variation in prices of the value of the output of the industries is determined
by the amount of labour required to produce that output [45, 46, 47, 48].
It is an extraordinarily strong result. There are not many pieces of eco-
nomics which are as well attested. The classical economists like Smith and
Ricardo took it as so obvious that they didn’t need to produce the evi-
dence. When neo-classical economics replaced classical economics as the
dominant theory, they didn’t actually produce any empirical evidence against
the Labour Theory of Value: they constructed an abstract, non-empirical set
of mathematical theories, which they claimed would explain how prices oper-
ated. Unfortunately these are actually a non-testable set of theories because
they have got more free variables than things you can observe. If you’ve got
a theory with more free variables than observations, then, by twiddling the
free variables you can explain anything, and your theory explains nothing
because it explains everything. This is Chaitin’s point again: scientific the-
ories have to have an information economy; they have to predict more than
the content of the theory [49].
This is the idea of Occam’s Razor — the shorter the explanation, the
more concise it is, the more, in some sense, correct that theory is. Basically,
neo-classical theory has no predictions of the overall price structure of the
economy. So why does the Labour Theory of Value still hold?
You can empirically observe that it holds and you can make hand waving
analogies between human labour and energy as Marx did, but that doesn’t
explain why it is that labour determines the value of things.
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One clue is to say that human beings are the only universal resource we
have, this would be a Capek/Turing style argument. Another theory was put
forward by two mathematicians Farjoun and Machover7 [50] in the 1980s.
Essentially they used a statistical mechanics argument to show that if
you make certain quite plausible assumptions about the probability of a firm
surviving if the price it obtains for its product is less than what they called
the integrated labour coefficient of that product. Suppose you are making
chocolate digestive biscuits, and a certain amount of labour is needed to make
the chocolate digestive, and wages have to be paid for that. Wages have to
be paid for the labour that goes into supplying the chocolate, that goes into
supplying the flour etc. You can go back and see how much was paid for
labour all the way back to the farmer. They say: “Suppose a firm is only
able to sell chocolate digestive biscuits for less than all the wages that were
paid all the way back through the supply-chain’. Well, It is clear that it is
very unlikely that the firm will remain in business for long, because not only
is it making a loss on its own account, but it is not even able to meet the
wage bills of the previous layers of the manufacturing process. So they said:
“Let’s assume only 5˜% of firms can be operating in that position. Then let’s
make a parsimonious assumption and assume that the ratio of actual prices
to labour content is normally distributed.”
If it is normally distributed then only a certain percentage of firms can
be in the position where they are selling it at such a low price. Then you
can say we have constrained the normal distribution to have a certain stan-
dard deviation. On that basis, they make a prediction about the standard
deviation of the ratios of values to prices, and they say: “It must be nar-
rowly distributed”. Any system with a large number of free variables which
are added together to produce an effect ends up being normally distributed:
that’s just a property of probabilities. In essence a random system, an en-
tropic system, will have a normal distribution. Now, if we just assume that,
and we make the additional constraint that firms can not remain solvent if
they can not meet their costs, with a low probability of surviving, then that
is enough to generate the labour theory of value.
The argument is basically an entropic one. The selling of commodities is a
chaotic process which ends up, due to entropy maximisation, with there being
7Interestingly Machover is a recursion theorist, i.e. works on the same general branch
of maths as Turing did.
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Figure 2: The rate of return on capital in Japan where robots are widely used has fallen
very low. The dashed line is the empirically measured rate of return, and the solid line
the equilibrium rate of return predicted by the labour theory of value, that is to say
the center of gravitation for the empirical rate. Graph by Tamerlan Tadjadinov, http:
//compbio.dcs.gla.ac.uk/cgi-bin/profits/home.cgi
a particular probability distribution of prices to labour content. This entropy
maximising distribution is one which has prices relatively closely clustered
around labour values. Watt and Smith were concerned with work, Watt and
Marx with work and power. Concepts derived from thermodynamics go from
explaining steam engines with Clausius, explaining gases with Boltzman,
explaining information with Shannon to deducing the labour theory of value
with Farjoun and Machover [51]. We come around full circle.
8. Second Cycle of Mechanisation
The whole foundation of the validity of labour theory of value has been
the indispensability of human labour. What will happen when robots can
replace almost all human workers?
If there are going to be more robots than people, it would seem that the
capital labour ratio in the economy will go through the roof. Both Marxian
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[52, 53] and neo-classical theory [54] predict that under such circumstances
the rate of return on capital, the rate of profit, will be much lower. Indeed if
we look at Japan where robots are perhaps more widely used than any other
country, the rate of return on capital has fallen very low (Figure 2). This
would seem to bear out the prediction.
A low rate of profit has a depressing effect on a capitalist economy. It
discourages investment and indeed the Japanese economy has been mired in
stagnation since the 1990s. There is a fear that this process is spreading
across the developed world [55]. Summers, in an influential article, talked
about a fall in the ‘natural rate of interest’ [56] contributing to ‘secular
stagnation’, and Roberts [57] refers to a fall in the rate of profit leading to
the long recession since 2008.
Robert Reich, former US Secretary of Labor, describes the development
of a nightmare economy in which robots do all the predictable work and
humans are limited to the scraps of work that robots cannot yet do [58].
These unpredictable micro-jobs will be coordinated by software packages such
as those used by Amazon for their ‘Mechanical Turk’ service or the U¨ber taxi
hire system. It is an economy with no job security, no workplace pension or
sickness benefit. The consequence is growing inequality, a middle class driven
into debt and unable to provide the market for the growing mass of products
produced by robot industry, which all reinforces secular stagnation [59]. This
narrative has been greatly strengthened by the recent publication Piketty’s
monumental work [60] on growing inequality.
There are some problems with the narrative. For a start, Piketty’s model
for the growth of inequality is based on the return on capital being greater
than the rate of growth of the economy. Under these circumstances he ar-
gues the share of wealth going to the owners of capital is bound to increase
from decade to decade, leading to a more and more unequal society. If Japan
is anything to go by, intense automation will lead to a lower rate of return
and tend to stabilise the degree of inequality of wealth. It remains plausi-
ble, though, that automation weakens the bargaining position of labour and
results in a more uneven distribution of income.
Even in Japan the robots in use today are not general purpose. Human
labour is still one essential input into all production processes. Japan has
an aging population and a low birth rate, which provides an incentive to
use robots, but these robots are nothing like the pass-as-human Androids in
Blade Runner. The look much like the one shown in Fig 1. They can not
walk off the production line and take a job driving a bus or working in a
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hospital. The whole argument for robots leading to a high capital labour
ratio and thus a low rate of return is the presumption that human labour
remains an essential input to every industry.
Suppose real droids of the sort envisaged by Asimov, Capek etc. could
be built: would this still hold? Could you, at least in principle, still have a
viable capitalist economy? For an answer to this we can turn not to Turing
who famously argued that computers will become as intelligent as humans
[61], but to another great pioneer of computing, John Von Neumann. Turing
was a polymath genius but his interests did not extend to economics. Also a
polymath, Von Neumann’s contributions spanned quantum mechanics [62],
computer design [63], self replicating machines [64] and economics [65]. He
came up with a basic design of computer still copied in every laptop and
smartphone.
What concerns us here are two other contributions. His theory of eco-
nomic equilibrium [65] described an idealised expanding capitalist system
that produced outputs in the same proportions as the inputs it used up.
He showed that under these circumstances the rate of growth would be the
same as the rate of profit and that there would be a unique set of prices that
would allow all industries to make this same rate of profit. His model econ-
omy was represented by what later came to be called an input output table
and which can be considered a generalisation to many more sectors of the
two sector reproduction schemes invented by Marx [66]. In Von Neumann’s
model, labour is just another produced input — produced by the amount
of food, clothes etc. required for the worker’s survival: a very classical or
Ricardian conception. It is clear that, in principle, without doing violence to
his Maths one can use the same sort of equations to represent an economy in
which all the ‘labour’ is now provided by robots. What you would then have
is the reductio ad absurdam of capitalism. It would be an economy of com-
peting firms, staffed by robots, all of whose output went into producing more
machinery and more robots. The robot-operated firms could still buy and
sell things, there would be prices and profits but there would be no human
consumers. It would be a capitalism unconstrained by the labour shortages
that have slowed Japan down, expanding until it met the physical limits of
the Earth.
Another strand of his work, addressed the problem of what would be
required to have systems of self-replicating machines [64], machines able to
build themselves without human intervention. This spawned off the field now
known as cellular automata which underly computer games like “Life”[67] or
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the early releases of of the popular economic simulation game Sim City[68].
More significantly his model of self reproducing machines which contain soft-
ware instructing them to make more copies of themselves was hugely in-
fluential in the modern understanding of the living cell and the role of the
genetic code in the cell. From that it goes on to influence the philosophy of
evolutionary theory in Dawkins [69] or Dennett [70].
So, in principle, one could have an exponentially growing robot capitalism.
Obviously a system that devotes all its output to producing more robots is
not in human interest. However, it would be a simple matter to alter the Von
Neumann economic model to get one that described a non-growing rentier
capitalism, one in which the entire surplus of the robot operated industry was
directed at producing luxuries for their owners rather than being reinvested8.
At this point, where universal robots are available, human labour would
have ceased to play the role that Adam Smith identified for it of regulating
all prices. Profit could be made without them. Workers would become
functionally redundant to the corporate economy. They would be the Nazis’
useless mouths. European history shows what happens when a state treats
humans as dispensable.
9. Reflection
When Stephen Hawking told the BBC: “The development of full artifi-
cial intelligence could spell the end of the human race”. he was apparently
thinking in terms of the intelligent machines themselves being our enemy.
It should be borne in mind that machines exist in the context of systems
of legal and social relations. We conventionally think of these relations as
being relations between people, but ‘people’ has an elastic meaning in this
case. Companies are legal persons, juridical subjects and states subjects in
international law. The Pashukanis school of legal theory [72] argued that it
is the abstract structural relations that come first. Legal personalities grow
from the relations. Humans are the bearers of these relations: actors playing
roles in a script laid down by the unwritten laws of social relations. In a
metaphor from Greek drama, Marx describes capitalists as Tra¨ger or wear-
ers of the capitalist mask, as actors bore masks in classical drama. Such a
8We feel dystopian models like that of Benzell et al. [71], which ignore the existence of
firms owning robots and assume all investment comes out of worker’s savings, are too far
removed from capitalist reality to provide a guide to what could happen.
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mask can, in principle, be worn by a computer. Indeed we already see this
when algorithmic traders enter into contracts that they have calculated will
be profitable. In financial markets time critical decisions are already being
taken by machine. As long ago as the 1987 algorithmic trading was being
blamed for a major stock market crash [73]. Given that such crashes affect
the lives of millions9 one could argue that the robots already took over 25
years ago.
From Turing’s standpoint, a network of human traders applying profit
maximising rules, or a network of computers performing algorithmic trades
are computationally the same, differing only in their clock speed. Indeed
there is little statistical evidence that the 1987 crash was much different,
other than in speed, from earlier ones when trading was manual [74]. Ever
since Hyndman blamed the severity of a crash on the telegraph [75], there has
been a tendancy to blame the latest communication technology. The traders,
whether manual or automatic, collectively comprise a distributed computer
with complex, irreducible, emergent behaviour.
The metaphor of the economy as a vast machine, crushing humans, in-
different to lives, hopes and aspirations was well understood by artists in the
20s and 30s: Capek’s RUR, Lang’s Metropolis, Chaplin’s Modern Times all
expressed this theme. The question is: how can the little people, Chaplin’s
heroes, overcome it?
10. Conclusion
The popular press trumpets the fact that robots will take over the world
[76, 77]. This paper considers the viability of this prediction by constructing a
philosophical argument, mining the rich literature on economics, information
theory and thermodynamics. We conclude that robots do not constitute a
serious threat, in terms of replacing humans in the labour market until such
time as genuinely ’universal’ robots are made.
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